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NEW METHODS TO OVERCOME ZONING RESTRICTIONS AGAINST TRANSPORTABLE HOUSING
by
James Jay Brown*, J. D., LL. M.
In a country which has just come through a period of abnormal­
ly low housing production and now faces the pressures of housing 
demand by returning Viet Nam veterans, solutions on how to in­
crease the housing supply must be immediate and practical. These 
solutions must be in the form of low-cost, decent housing in areas 
of moderate to intense urban settlements and not on the rural 
fringes away from job opportunities and social contacts. Ameri­
cans have prided themselves in their ability to overcome extreme 
crises; housing needs and goals are just such a test of that know­
how and ability. (1)
Getting lower-cost housing into urban areas regulated by 
zoning controls is the most difficult problem facing industrialized 
housing manufacturers today. Only in the rare exceptions of 
federally-assisted “ demonstration”  or model projects are devel­
opers and manufacturers able to achieve any breakthroughs. Yet, 
it is undisputed that lower-cost manufactured housing is available 
and marketable by the mobile home industry, (2) and may be one 
answer to urban development on non-tract, scattered residential 
lots.
What, then, can be done to open urbanized communities? The 
answer will be sought within the explicit and subtle forms of ex­
clusion by zoning ordinance definition and case law interpretation 
of dwelling. The outcome of such explorations will be in the form 
of recommended ordinance changes. The mobile home zoning 
cases contain the best directly comparable legal arguments which 
provide an analytical comparative basis for predicting resistance 
to transportable manufactured dwellings. It is assumed through­
out that the existing mobile home industry, as experienced manu­
facturers of modular dwellings, is the only group available to 
immediately meet a significant segment of lower-cost housing 
demand, (3) and that the group can adjust their production methods 
to comply with the high performance standard manufactured-home 
building codes. (4) It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore 
the problems of complying with traditional specification building 
codes, which have formed the second barrier to transportable 
housing within developed areas.
FUNCTION OF HOUSING REGULATION: Generally
Zoning ordinances as we know them today have their antecedents 
in municipal recognition that gunpowder mills, storehouses, and 
wooden buildings should be prohibited from heavily populated areas. 
As the evils of high density development and occupancy manifested 
themselves in the 19th and early 20th centuries, urban tenement 
district ordinances began to reflect the desirability of requiring 
open space, air, light and ventilation around each and every habited 
building for health and safety reasons. Thusly, municipal land 
uses are regulated under the broad legal warrant of protecting 
health, safety and general welfare, by controlling height, bulk and 
lot area and yards for the structure (insuring separations against 
fire and providing child play areas); limiting levels of noise, glare, 
odor and pollution; restricting street congestion (off-street garages 
and parking lots); requiring installation or connection to adequate 
utility services; and segregating incompatible physical uses and 
future developments (to preserve existing property values). These 
have been deemed to be valid police power acts by court decisions 
too numerous to recount. What such regulations do not speak to 
are the methods, materials and costs of construction; nor do they 
address themselves to the precise uses an apparently conforming
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structure may be designed to provide. The zoning of districts for 
“ compatible”  uses has produced the crazy-quilt pattern so familiar 
in every city; a pattern that reflects the battle between vested 
land-owner interests and the legitimate growth and natural change 
inherent in an urbanization process predicated upon the philosophy 
of “ highest and best use. ”
Coincident with the zoning concerns stated above, was the 
public concern over building uses within a purely health orientation. 
Various health agencies began inspections for compliance under 
what we now call a housing code. The objective of such regulations 
is the improvement of living conditions from socio-psychological, 
as well as sanitary and safety, standards. (6) Where housing 
codes have been enforced, the above objectives are generally 
sacrificed on the altar of hardship of owners under existing housing 
market conditions. (7) Such results are inevitable where the living 
environmental concerns of the housing code are applied after the 
structural safety concerns of the building code have been satisfied.
Satisfactory human living conditions were assumed under 
conventional wisdom, predicated on a laissez faire market philos­
ophy, to have been incorporated into all consumer-acceptable, 
competitively-priced dwellings. Experience has proved the con­
verse and produced varied legal-administrative responses as 
solutions, such as combining the functions of building and housing 
regulations under one administrative body. Although this may be 
unworkable, (8) logic and experience dictate that unless housing 
code features are incorporated at the construction stage under 
building code regulation, and their cost incorporated within the 
primary mortgage they will be unaffordable by subsequent owners.
Fortunately, the regional model building code formuiators and 
the mobile home industry are finally becoming aware of technolog­
ical advancements by promulgating and adopting performance code 
standards and abandoning specification standards, which were un­
concerned with and devoid of housing code environmental goals. 
Recognizing that the private developers were building structures 
safe against the natural elements, code inspectors can now begin 
to concentrate their regulatory attentions on the quality of living 
conditions within the dwellings.
Even though the new standards are oriented toward structural 
problems, the minimum air temperature, plumbing and electrical 
guidelines will maintain a living environment more in compliance 
with existing housing codes. Manufactured modules which conform 
to the new standards unquestionably satisfy code sanitary require­
ments by being inherently immune to gnawing rodents and to vermin 
which infest conventional urban residential structures. With this 
shift in focus, the overlapping goals of building and housing codes 
should become recognized and legislative-administrative acts 
formulated to unite the goals into a solitary effort to provide decent 
housing.
It is within this context of parochial, separated municipal 
regulatory activity, devoid of unified goal achievement, that the 
dilemma of the lower cost house must be considered. No longer 
is it produceable by conventional methods; no longer are land, 
financing and promotional costs sufficiently low that new entrepre­
neurs can enter the competitive market at this price scale. Only 
by manufacturing methods within the mobile-modular field can such 
dwellings supply market demands. Quite suprisingly, however, 
the mobile home is an anomaly in American planning and zoning.
It has never been seriously considered in official planning litera­
ture or practice, yet, in 1969, 6 million Americans inhabited 
mobile residences. (9)
APPLICATION OF ZONING: Restriction by Technicality
Zoning ordinance regulation of mobile homes has been most 
observable as a restriction to sites within trailer camps under 
special requirements as a conditional use (10) and by total exclu­
sion from any residential district. (11) Where they are permitted
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as residences, their location has been relegated to agricultural or 
non-urban districts, (12) or to an onerous situs in conjunction with 
industrial (13) or commercial uses only. (14) The cumulative 
effect has been to exclude entirely or relegate the mobile home to 
the worst use areas. (15)
The primary regulatory device of the ordinance is the defini­
tion per se. If a dwelling is “ a building or part thereof designed 
or used exclusively for residential purposes”  (16) and a building 
is “ any structure designed (or), constructed . . . for the support, 
enclosure, shelter or protection of persons . . . except a tent or 
trailer, ”  then a mobile home ( i .e ., trailer) is not a permitted use 
in the R-Single-Family Dwelling District of Richmond, Virginia; 
but, is within regulated trailer camps only. (17) This particular 
code definition of trailer emphasizes, as so many do, its vehicular 
design for highway travel, thereby disqualifying it as a structure 
on the characteristic of permanency of attachment to or on the 
ground.
To summarize, in defining just what a “ dwelling”  is for 
zoning and building purposes, municipal ordinances have consis­
tently placed heavy emphasis upon a structure’s residential 
character (18) as a home, residence, or sleeping place for human 
beings. However, although a dwelling unit may be a room or group 
of rooms located within a dwelling which forms a habitable unit for 
one family, (19) a dwelling for human habitation may not be a 
house trailer. (20) Another means of exclusion is to relate duration 
of fixation to site as a determination of dwelling permanency. 
“ Temporary housing is defined as any tent, trailer, mobile home, 
or any other shelter designed to be transportable and not attached 
to the ground, to another structure, or to any utility system on 
the same premises for more than 30 consecutive days. ”  (21)
These forms of classification and restriction, enacted without 
stated reasons, have been enforced perfunctorily under various 
guises of case precedent.
The Common Law definitional evolution of dwelling has not 
been free from ambiguity. Any house in which people dwell might 
be considered a dwelling. (22) However, even though a dwelling 
has various meanings under the laws of burglary, insurance, home­
stead, and real property, the predominant distinguishing character­
istic appears to be habitability for man. (23)
Davis v. State (24) held that by looking at the outside facts and 
circumstances, use of a building as a dwelling would make it so. 
Whereas the character of building occupancy (as a residency for a 
family or habitation by man) defines dwelling, the purpose for 
which the dwelling was erected may not always be controlling. (25) 
However, where a dwelling classification has been made to depend 
upon more than the fact that it is a building the use of which is 
habitation for man, such an interpretation has been ruled arbitrary 
and unreasonable. (26) A dwelling, under an equity interpretation 
of a deed restriction, was a house possessing the requisite ele­
ments for habitability: four walls and a roof. (27) “ The interior 
arrangement within the four walls and under the roof determines 
whether the same is a ‘dwelling house’ , or what kind of ‘house’ it 
is. ”  (28) A structure may be a dwelling house if it is sufficient to 
permit one family to reside in it through a 6-month winter. (29)
An old Wisconsin Supreme Court case (30) construed their home­
stead statutes to hold that for the property exemption to obtain the 
owner must in good faith inhabit the commercially leased structure 
as his residence, habitation or dwelling house. (31)
Within the meaning of an Indiana arson statute, a trailer with­
out wheels resting on cement blocks was not a dwelling house for 
lack of permanent attachment to the realty. (32) Of greater rele­
vancy was the four man dissent which challenged that conclusion 
first on the grounds that both burglary and arson statutes have the 
fundamental concern for preservation and security of home and 
habitation. Secondly, a more precise reading of dictionary and 
case definitions emphasize the key elements of occupancy of a 
building by a family as a place of habitation and residence regard­
less of the character of the structure. (33) The dissent assembled 
an impressive array of state cases dealing with a variety of 
structures, some of which were not permanently affixed to the 
earth, yet were held to be dwellings. Finally under the facts 
elicited in testimony, the trailer, as affixed to blocks resting on 
the earth, possessed all the internal features to make it completely 
suitable as a dwelling, and was so used when burned.
Under the law of burglary, a dwelling house is an apartment, 
building or cluster of buildings in which a man, with his family, 
resides. (34) Thusly, this representative sampling of definitional 
cases conveys the common thread of intent to and actual occupancy 
for residency purposes. There are no requirements as to the type 
of structure or of its permanency, although some support for 
permanency of occupation is observable. (35)
Although at first glance, the mobile home would seem to fit 
within the definition of dwelling, the recent decisions which test 
such meanings reflect a lack of consistency. (36) If a consistency 
is identifiable it is within the problematic concentrations of per­
manency of attachment to the realty, duration of location in one 
place, and mobility.
The case decisions interpreting ordinance definitions are over­
whelmingly against permitting residential intrusion of mobile units, 
as exemplified in a 1970 case. (37) There have been decisions to 
the contrary based upon inadequately drawn ordinance definitions 
(38) which do not specifically exclude trailers. (39) Once perma­
nently immobilized, a unit may conform to the dwelling terminology. 
(40) And, owners who affix the home to the property with the intent 
to use it for residential purposes have been held to comply with the 
previously identified common law definitions. (41) However, intent, 
occupancy, and suitability as habitation may be disregarded in 
favor of an overriding concern with the physical facts about a build­
ing justifying its exclusion. (42)
When trailer usage is segregated into designated parks, uti­
lization of one as a separate unit or as a component part of a build­
ing, regardless of suitability for living within a residential zone, 
is a punishable offense. (43) The dissenting opinion, herein, was 
more discerning than the majority concerning the issue of whether 
a structure built off the site was a residential dwelling. Consid­
ering the necessities of life, so long as job opportunities are 
locally obtainable, the intent to maintain a mobile home perma­
nently affixed should be controlling. The interdependency of main­
taining a residence and retention of gainful employment were 
clearly recognized. Permanency of residence was further identi­
fied with mode of taxation. Finally, as long as a mobile unit was 
as much a functioning residence as a conventional house rolled 
onto a site, and it conformed to local residential regulation, its 
manner and place of construction were insufficient criteria on 
which to exclude it from residentially zoned districts. The manu­
factured unit was entitled to the same regulation and protection 
afforded to other dwellings. Anything less would constitute illegal 
arbitrary actions.
Fortunately, the overwhelming uninformed legal fixation of 
equating transient or temporary living with off-site produced 
housing is being whittled away, (see the Sioux Falls, Lescault, In 
re Willey, Morin and Crawford cases noted above) by the realiza­
tion that any permanent residence, regardless of construction, 
can be moved from its foundation to another location. (44)
In a retrospective review of these decisions which conflict 
over interpretations of seemingly uncomplicated terms, it becomes 
clear that the courts seldom delve into the explicit and implicit 
reasons for legislative classification and segregation. The 
mechanical restatements of precedent are applied without much 
analysis and the pronouncements are more provoking for their 
unspoken policy presumptions than for their gymnastics with facts 
and ordinances in order to produce denials of use. Unfortunately 
a degree of ignorance and hearsay perpetuate these policy pre­
sumptions, and the Bench and Bar have been as uninformed as the 
legislatures. To complete the understanding of the restrictive 
legal decisions, several factual studies will be explored to indicate 
the fallacies in and refutability of the underlying presumptions.
Mobile homes are inhabited by lower-class peoples, who are 
striving to move up on the economic scale and, therefore, have no 
community concern or any permanency. One study’s set of statis­
tics disputed this by showing that over 60 per cent of mobile home 
dwellers were engaged in some manual or blue-collar work, (45) 
while another study reported that within the predominant manual 
employee-occupant group there were included a substantial per­
centage of skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen. (46) A survey in 
New England (47) indicated that mobile homes were used by a 
cross section of moderate income households. Almost a fifth of 
the occupants were young married couples and another fifth were
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older or retired couples. This same survey indicated that econo­
mic segregation of what many town residents felt was a lower 
income group was one motivation behind some zoning and sub­
division regulations excluding the mobile home. (48)
Disregarding for a moment the facts which contradict the 
inferior income fallacy, should mobile home occupants c reate a 
slum with their allegedly inferior life styles, a depreciated mobile 
unit would be easier to remove by either public or private action 
than a dilapidated conventionally-built structure.
The presence of a mobile home has an adverse effect upon 
residential property values. As an appraiser’s maxim this state­
ment would be true regardless of where a house were built if the 
new dwelling has a significantly lower value than all surrounding 
properties. This is also true where there is a great disparity in 
appearance between the new and existing structures, whether the 
former is an ultra-modern conventionally-built or an all-aluminum 
clad mobile home. But, this is a surface or cosmetic feature of 
the transportable dwelling which has been corrected by most major 
manufacturers. Bair has maintained that there is no valid plan­
ning or economic basis for exclusion where standards of appearance 
have been met. (49)
Mobile home residents do not carry their fair share of the 
local tax burden. This allegation is not maintainable, either, 
when it is realized that the young married and over-55 age group 
occupants, 40 per cent of the mobile dwelling occupants as pre­
viously identified, do not add to the burden of the school districts 
with school-aged children. And, as more jurisdictions decide that 
mobile units are permanent affixations to the realty, they become 
taxed as real property either by statute or court decree, (50) 
thereby supporting municipal services. Equitable real property 
taxation is realized in mobile home parks and subdivision zones 
also, because taxes are included in the lot rental fee.
RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Clearly, the manufactured off-site dwelling, characterized as 
a mobile or modular home, satisfies or can satisfy legal and con­
temporary definitions—standards of suitability for habitation. The 
unstated policy presumptions underlying official restrictions on 
such dwellings are not justifiable, as new socio-economic research 
indicates. How then, in light of the present housing crisis and the 
long-term national housing goals, can zoning ordinances be cor­
rected to permit an equal treatment of these homes ?
The most logical first step would be to factually demonstrate 
to the unconcerned municipal officials that the current factory- 
built house is a dwelling, just as suitable and safely habitable as 
conventionally-built dwellings within their jurisdictions. A policy 
statement, in the form of a purpose clause, should be incorporated 
into the zoning ordinance to that effect. Further, municipal 
acceptance of environmentally-sound housing, from the building and 
housing code objectives, would dictate that it become official 
policy to separate transportable dwellings from transient trailers 
and vacation campers. The latter vehicles, defined by their us­
ability independent from municipal utilities, should be relegated to 
locations within designated parks only.
Such a distinction, formulated to overcome misconceptions 
about legislative intent, sets the stage for the deletion within rele­
vant ordinance sections of restrictions against homes of a mobile 
nature. Establishing a definitional distinction between types of 
manufactured units would foster more legal precision among legis­
lators, lawyers and administrators. It is an unfortunate fact that 
in the cases analyzed for this study, the term “ trailer,”  with all 
of the explicit evil connotations from the ‘30’s and ‘40’s, was used 
when referring to a permanently immobilized 1970 dwelling.
Definitions within the ordinance should be redrafted to exclude 
arbitrary restrictions against mobile homes as dwellings and 
against buildings not possessing load-bearing exterior walls. 
Dwelling should be written so as to include ready-for-human- 
occupancy, off-site manufactured units, which are intended to be 
securely affixed to a foundation and, which are dependent for 
occupational use upon connection to public utilities. Minimum 
floor areas and exterior finishes might be designated, also. 
Duration of permanent attachment may not be a necessary require­
ment in view of the cost of affixation and the potential movability of
even conventional housing. The terms manufactured or modular 
house should be defined to mean units which, as delivered from a 
factory or other assembly point, contain completely installed 
electrical, plumbing, and temperature control equipment. Perma­
nent affixation should be described with the primary significance 
placed upon the owner’s intention to make the dwelling stationary 
on some kind of stable foundation by the removal of transport 
mechanisms.
In conjunction with such definitional improvements, modifi­
cations should be made in the residential zone sections of the 
ordinance. Permitted uses should include the transportable 
dwelling. Lot size and yard requirement site standards should be 
flexibly adjustable to modular dimensions. Minimum dwelling 
unit standards on interior floor area might be reduced to reflect 
the moderate needs of child-less single and young or older couples. 
External architectural standards might be established with 
reference to existing municipal architectural trends or designs.
Lot coverage and floor area ratios should be adjustable accordingly. 
In other respects, the modular dwelling would comply with other 
general residential regulations, such as on height and off-street 
parking.
The cumulative effect of these first steps in ordinance re ­
vision would be to make it legally difficult for municipal officials 
to more restrictively interpret the zoning law against permitted 
dwellings. Their guiding public policy would be a forthright pro­
motion of new decent housing which incorporates technological 
advancements for the greater general welfare. If there is to be a 
restriction, it must be predicated upon a factual determination 
that the manufactured home is unfit for permanent residential use. 
Only after this point has been established can it be maintained that 
public regulation of a transportable dwelling is reasonable. Since 
this issue of reasonableness involves the definition of dwelling for 
human habitation, only objectionable and substandard units would 
be excluded under the suggested ordinance revisions. In this way, 
the challenge of meeting the existing lower-cost housing demand 
might be made somewhat less overwhelming.
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